DOU 11/05/2023 - Diário Oficial da União - Brasil

TEXTO OFICIAL · ÍNTEGRA

Documento assinado digitalmente conforme MP nº 2.200-2 de 24/08/2001, que institui a Infraestrutura de Chaves Públicas Brasileira - ICP-Brasil. Este documento pode ser verificado no endereço eletrônico http://www.in.gov.br/autenticidade.html, pelo código 05152023051100169 169 Nº 89, quinta-feira, 11 de maio de 2023 ISSN 1677-7042 Seção 1 However, China's broadband network still has problems such as unclear positioning of public infrastructure, unbalanced regional and urban-rural development, insufficient application services, insufficient technological originality, and incomplete development environment. Need to be resolved. (...) Adhere to the combination of government guidance and market regulation. Adhere to the basic role of the market in allocating resources, give play to the government's strategic leadership role, and improve policies and measures. (...) Promote the construction of the access network in accordance with the ideas of high-speed access, wide coverage, multiple methods, and local conditions. Promote the construction of metropolitan area networks in accordance with the ideas of high-speed transmission, integrated bearing, intelligent perception, and safety and control. (...) Gradually promote the application of high-speed transmission, packetized transmission and large-capacity routing and switching technologies in metropolitan area networks. (...) 3. Key tasks (1) Promote the coordinated development of regional broadband networks. East area. Support the eastern region to carry out network upgrades and application innovations. Actively use optical fiber, next-generation mobile communication technology, and next-generation radio and television network technology to comprehensively improve the speed and performance of broadband networks, and strive to narrow the gap with developed countries; accelerate the deployment of IPv6-based next-generation Internet; encourage the eastern region to integrate local economic and social development needs , Actively carry out regional pilot demonstrations, innovate broadband application services, and cultivate and develop new businesses and new formats. (...) Increase financial support. Improve the universal service compensation mechanism of telecommunications, and form a long-term mechanism to support the development of broadband in rural and central and western regions. Make full use of various types of special funds from the central government to guide local related funds to invest in broadband network research and development and industrialization, as well as the development of broadband networks in rural areas, old, young and poor areas. Provide discount support to eligible national-level development zone broadband construction projects in the western region. Strengthen tax preferential support. Include the construction and operation of broadband networks in the western region into the "Catalogue of Encouraged Industries in the Western Region" to support broadband development in the western region. (...) Promote patent and other intellectual property pledge financing, increase financing support for broadband application service companies, and actively support qualified broadband application service companies to directly raise capital in domestic and overseas capital markets. 163. No âmbito das políticas de incentivo ao desenvolvimento da rede de banda larga, consta da petição o documento intitulado The General Office of the State Council on Accelerating the Construction of High-speed Broadband Networks Guiding Opinions on Promoting Network Speed Increase and Fee Reduction State Council (2015) No. 41, que elenca ações necessárias para acelerar a construção da estrutura de rede de banda larga, incrementar a velocidade, reduzir custo e melhorar o serviço. 164. De acordo com as peticionárias, o 13º Plano Quinquenal (2016-2020) ("The 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of The People's Republic Of China") enfatizou o desenvolvimento do setor de alta tecnologia, estabelecendo como objetivo tornar a China independente de outros países na produção de produtos de alto valor agregado, incluindo a internet como um instrumento para tal política por meio do desenvolvimento de tecnologias que tornem a China mais eficiente no processo produtivo. O referido documento também faz menção à rede de fibra óptica de alta velocidade, conforme segue: New Generation High-Speed Fiber-Optic Networks We will establish backbone networks for modern communications and strengthen capabilities with respect to high-speed transmission, flexible scheduling, and intelligent adapters. We will move faster in deploying fiber optic broadband access: for urban areas, we will ensure optical network coverage, provide gigabit and higher network access services, and see that home broadband subscribers in large and medium cities have flexibility in choosing services in excess of 100 Mbps, while for rural areas, we will work to make sure that 98% of administrative villages are linked up to fiber-optic networks, 100 Mbps or higher access service capabilities are available in areas where conditions permit, and more than half of rural home broadband subscribers have flexibility in choosing services in excess of 50 Mbps. We will establish open international communications facilities, refine the distribution of international communication networks, and improve cross-border land and submarine cable infrastructure. We will develop an online Silk Road with the Arab countries and others and accelerate the development of the China-ASEAN Information Harbor. 165. Ainda a respeito do 13º Plano Quinquenal, as peticionárias citaram o relatório "US-China Economic and Security Review Commission - Staff Report", de acordo com o qual a China teria estabelecido metas ambiciosas para o setor de informação e telecomunicação por meio do "Plano Internet Plus". 166. Segundo o relatório, "to capitalize on China's huge online consumer market and optimize manufacturing, finance, healthcare, and government, the Internet Plus plan is aimed at building up the country's domestic mobile Internet, cloud computing, big data, and the Internet of Things sector firms and creating global competitors by assisting domestic firms' expansion abroad". 167. Ademais, o referido documento se refere às expectativas de crescimento do mercado de dados chinês (data market) e de investimento do governo chinês no setor: China's big data market is expected to grow from RMB 110.5 billion ($17 billion) to RMB 879 billion ($135.2 billion) by 2020. (...) National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and Ministry of Industry and Information Technology announced that China would invest $179.1 billion (RMB 1.2 trillion) to improve broadband and mobile networks from 2016 to 2018. 168. Em relação ao 14º Plano Quinquenal (2021-2025) (The 14th Five-Year Plan of the People's Republic of China -Fostering High-Quality Development), as peticionárias ressaltaram a continuidade do foco em fortalecer a capacidade de inovação nacional em alta tecnologia por meio do ganho de proeminência na manufatura e digitalização e centralidade de uma agenda de modernização: 6. Manufacturing and digitalization gain prominence. The Plan aims to keep the share of manufacturing in GDP stable after a decade of decline. Fiscal incentives, wider access to credit, and more efficient industrial land use are among the tools to support the sector. The digitalization of the economy will continue with the share of the digital economy in GDP set to increase to 10% of GDP by 2025, from 7.8% in 2020. Cloud computing, big data, internet (including internet of things and industrial internet), block chain, artificial intelligence, and virtual and augmented reality will be supported. 7. Innovation at the center of the modernization agenda. A 10-year action plan for basic research and an annual increase in research and development (R&D) spending by at least 7% are at the core of the PRCˆs initiative to enhance scientific and technological capability. This is expected to unleash indigenous innovation and reduce the countryˆs reliance on foreign inputs, mostly in high-technology manufactured goods. Efforts will focus on aerospace, biotech, neuroscience, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and semiconductors, where the country expects to become a global leader in the longer term. 169. As peticionárias evocaram, adicionalmente, o plano Made in China 2025, lançado pelo governo chinês em 2015 para impulsionar a modernização da capacidade industrial da China e se referiram ao artigo Made in China 2025 do Institute for Security & Development Policy. O artigo afirma que "over a 10 to 15-year period, the plan is to 'drive digital manufacturing forward by increasing digitization and the interconnection of products.' This involves adopting information technology and the internet of things to connect its small and medium-sized companies to global production networks, in turn making them more efficient and competitive". 170. O relatório da Comissão Europeia - Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People's Republic of China for the Purposes of Trade Defence Investigations, fornecido pelas peticionárias, afirma que o referido plano se baseia em três passos para desenvolver a indústria chinesa: The first step aims to 'turn China into a major manufacturing power in ten years', the second step which should be implemented between 2025 and 2035 aims at China reaching 'intermediate level among world manufacturing powers', and in the third step, ending in 2049, China is supposed to achieve a more consolidated manufacturing sector which will allow China to 'transform [itself] into the global manufacturing leader before the centennial of the founding of New China'. 171. No que diz respeito ao controle estatal nas empresas chinesas, esse mesmo relatório informa que "some key sectors are even kept under full state control simply by means of regulatory prohibition for non-state companies to enter. SASAC's 2015 provisional list of SOEs in sectors where absolute state control should be maintained featured the following enterprises: China Telecom Group; China Mobile Group; and China United Network Communications Group". Na opinião das peticionárias esse fato evidencia a influência do Estado chinês no setor de telecomunicações. 172. As peticionárias forneceram indícios de influência estatal no setor de cabos de fibra óptica remetendo a informações de relatórios anuais sobre a composição acionária de empresas atuantes no setor. Foi citado o exemplo da empresa Jiangsu Zhongli Group Co., Ltd. que conta com duas empresas estatais dentre seus acionistas, China Development Bank Guokai Finance Co.,Ltd. e ChangShu Development and Investment . As peticionárias afirmaram que outras empresas também apresentavam quadro acionário estatais, tais como Shenzen Tefa Information Co.; Changfei Optical Fibre & Cable Co., Ltd. (YOFC); Tianjin Futong Xinmao Technology; Jiangsu Zhongtian Technology (ZTT) e Fiberhome Communication Technology. 173. Além disso, as peticionárias sublinharam a existência de registros de recebimento de subsídios governamentais nos relatórios/demonstrativos financeiros anuais dessas e outras empresas do setor em tela. 174. No caso da empresa Changfei Optical Fibre & Cable Co., Ltd. (YOFC), as peticionárias apontaram recebimento de subsídios em ativos na forma de investimento para revitalização industrial, desenvolvimento tecnológico e projetos de construção relacionados a fibras ópticas e às matérias-primas utilizadas na produção de cabos de fibra óptica. 175. Do relatório anual de 2020 da YOFC consta recebimento de RMB 127.390.031 a título de subvenções e subsídios governamentais (grants and subsidies) relativos a renda e ativos. Dentre esses subsídios as peticionárias destacaram os seguintes montantes: (i) RMB 317.200 - "2019 Provincial-level R&D investment subsidies, district-level supporting facilities", (ii) RMB 70.190.248 - "One Enterprise One Policy" Five-Year Development Special Fund"; (iii) RMB 5.004.000 - "Special funds for trade development"; (iv) RMB 4.798.055- "Job stabilization subsidy" e (v) RMB 4.427.600 - "Special funds allocated by the Development Zone Management Committee". No relatório semestral de 2021 da mesma empresa, as peticionárias indicaram recebimento de subvenções e subsídios relativos a renda e ativos no valor de RMB 28.975.501. 176. As peticionárias alegaram que a empresa Jiangsu Zhongtian Technology (ZTT) divulgou em seu relatório anual de 2020 ter recebido RMB 215.963.623,14 de subsídios governamentais relacionados à renda diferida, o que representou aumento significativo (RMB 101.966.889,98) em relação aos subsídios governamentais obtidos no ano anterior. A ZTT também recebeu subsídios governamentais para projetos com o objetivo de apoiar a industrialização e o desenvolvimento tecnológico da empresa, introduzindo tecnologias avançadas especialmente na área de telecomunicações e fibras ópticas, dentre os quais "Transformação técnica de pré-formados supergrandes"; "Projeto de construção de bateria de lítio"; "Projeto de cabo especial"; e "Pacote de Investimento". A ZTT recebeu outros subsídios governamentais, incluindo um valor total de RMB 81.751.770,86 em 2021. 177. No que se refere à empresa Fiberhome Communication Technology Co., Ltd. (Fiberhome), as peticionárias sublinharam o registro de recebimento de subsídios governamentais nos relatórios anual de 2020 e semestral de 2021 nos montantes de RMB 467.480.187,76 e RMB 495.820.427,95, respectivamente. Cabe ressaltar que não foi possível localizar o valor de subsídios de 2021 apontado pelas peticionárias, mas sim o valor de RMB 489.726.155,94. 178. Os registros da empresa Jiangsu Hengtong Optoelectronics Company Limited (Hengtong) também foram analisados pelas peticionárias. Consta do relatório anual de 2020 o recebimento de RMB 318.727.174,11 a título de "Government grants included in current profit or loss, except for those closely related to the Company's normal business operations, which are in accordance with national policies and are enjoyed on an ongoing basis in accordance with certain criteria and in fixed or quantitative amounts". As peticionárias citaram o relatório semestral de 2021 dessa empresa, no entanto, apresentaram relatório pertencente a outra empresa, a Jiangsu Changdian Technology Company Limited. 179. As peticionárias arrolaram registros de recebimento de subsídios por outras empresas, a saber: - Tongding Internet Information Co. (Tongding) - RMB 46.992.102,72 em subvenções (grants). De acordo com o item 84 (Government grants) relatório anual de 2020, p. 556, as subvenções governamentais foram destinadas a várias finalidades, tais como o Optical fiber and communication cable industrialization project. As peticionárias citaram o relatório semestral de 2021 sem apresenta-lo. - Jiangsu Zhongli Group Co., Ltd. (Zhongli) - no relatório anual de 2020 registro de subsídios governamentais no total de RMB 123.525.132,12 e ainda total de RMB 108.056,71 a título de financiamento no âmbito dos Enterprise Technology in Qinghai Province Innovation funds. Sobre o montante relativo a esses fundos, as peticionárias originalmente indicaram total de RMB 107.000,00, mas o total não condiz com os dados do relatório (p. 170). Do relatório semestral de 2021, consta apontamento de RMB 8.886.430,41 referentes a Governemnt special fund subsidies. - Shenzhen Tefa Information Co. (Tefa) - no relatório anual de 2020 indicação de subsídios governamentais no total de RMB 93.953.798,56 e no relatório semestral de 2021, as peticionárias indicaram o valor de RMB 16.307.334,37, classificadas como "Other cash received in connection with operating activities". Porém, também foram identificados subsídios governamentais no valor de RMB 58.957.585,04.